Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Laycock – – In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. A crucial part of Taurek’s argument is his contention that i. John M. Taurek, ” Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 4. (Summer I ). Oxford University Press USA publishes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, children’s books, business books, dictionaries, reference.

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For any harm that Yoda can prevent for any of the four Jedi, that harm is serious. In particular, I argued that on the Standard Picture, what distinguishes nonconsequentialists from consequentialists is not that numbers and aggregation do not matter, but that they matter only as one input among many in a deliberative, practical reasoning process about what a moral agent ought to do.

The other three—A, B, and C—only need one pill in order to restore both of their arms. Michael Otsuka has suggested though that Taurek can reject this line of thought by drawing a distinction between pairwise comparisons which do not involve any appeal to groups and those comparisons that involve appeals to groups.

Should the numbers count?


I think that Otsuka can establish this conclusion, but not by way of how he presents the argument. Indeed, as noted earlier, Taurek does not say that one must toss a coin. Skip to main content. Unlike much of the dialectic between Taurek and his opponents, we will see that this argument is dialectically effective insofar as it does not employ premises that Taurek explicitly rejects.

Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake thhe the overall social good?

The following not exhaustive list of items require moderator pre-approval: The well-being of x is worse in comparison to the well-being of y to a nontrivial degree prior to any intervention by S. The harm that S can prevent for x is serious, and the harm that S can prevent for y is not serious. PAA says that what is distinctive about persons is not that they are incommensurable or that they each embody an equal claim that cannot be aggregated but can be substituted, compared and so on; but that they are moral agents capable of deliberating and being persuaded by moral reasons.


Second, if the well-being of x and y are equal in comparison prior to any intervention by S, and the harm that S can prevent for both is serious, then the claims of both x and y are not to be dismissed even if the harm that S can prevent for x is greater in comparison to the harm that S can prevent for y to a non-trivial degree: A, B and C are each given a one-third chance of being chosen.

If Secura is chosen, she receives two pills. Henry Laycock – shoulv In Alex Barber ed. For one of these persons, Susan, if she takes one pill then one of her arms will be restored; if she takes two pills, then both of her arms will be restored; and, if she takes three pills, then both of her arms and one of her legs will be restored. Of course, pro-number nonconsequentialists have shied away from aggregation because they think that it violates the separateness jonh persons. Wasserman, David and Alan Strudler.

This inconsistency in turn provides us with a good reason to reject numbers skepticism.

Oxford University Press, The chosen Jedi receives one pill. You only have time to go to one of the islands to rescue the people on it.

Rethinking how non-consequentialists should count lives

Otsuka argues against PN and thus against Numbers Skepticism by attempting to demonstrate that PN, in conjunction with an additional moral principle, entails inconsistent choices regarding what ought to be done in certain circumstances, and that this a reason to reject PN and thus reject Numbers Skepticism. Oxford University Press,for discussions of these paradoxes of transitivity. Cambridge University Press,pp.

What We Owe to Each Other. From 3, one can substitute A with B. Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain taudek sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: Yoda has three pills aboard the spaceship that can alleviate the suffering caused by the disintegration of the flesh.


Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for an equivalent benefit or to avoid an equivalent harm: Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. The problem with PAC though is that its stopping point seems arbitrary. Sign in to use this feature.

In particular, why could someone not say that the point at which one should spare C his loss is precisely when C is in a larger group than B, and that even if the choice were Bs he too should prefer that C be spare his loss, that is, the greater number should be saved?

Accordingly, in i A has both uohn restored and Susan has no limbs restored.

Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting | Yishai Cohen –

If you have unrelated thoughts or don’t wish to read the content, please post your own thread or simply refrain from commenting. For, when one tosses a coin as Taurek suggests, one need not thereby claim that persons are commensurable and can be substituted or balanced or be given some proportional chance. Post titles must describe the philosophical content of the posted material, cannot be unduly provocative or click-baity and cannot be in all caps.

Therefore, PAC would require that we save the individual who stands to lose her life instead of the individual who only stands to lose his finger. Anthony Skelton – – Journal of Global Ethics 12 2: